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STATE OF ALASKA

THE ALASKA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Before Commissioners:

Sam Cotten, Chairman
Alyce A. Hanley
Dwight D. Ornquist
Tim Cook
James M. Posey

In the Matter of the Request by)
GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC., for)
Waiver of 3 AAC 52.355(a) and)
Approval of a 50-Site Demonstra-)
tion Project)

U-95-38

REVISED REDACTED STAFF REPORT

— The Commission Staff submits the attached revised redacted version of its report on the General Communication, Inc. (GCI) 50 site DAMA Project. This version provides the text of the Staff report, but excludes the attachments, consistent with the agreement of GCI and Alascom, Inc.

DATED: October 14, 1998.

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STAFF REPORT

On June 22, 1995, GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC. (GCI), filed a request for waiver of 3 AAC 52.355(a) to begin a demonstration project in which GCI would construct new satellite communications facilities in 50 locations in rural Alaska. The Commission granted approval of the GCI Demonstration Project¹ and required that various market and company data be regularly filed by both GCI and by Alascom, Inc. d/b/a AT&T Alascom (Alascom). Staff was directed by the Commission to file a report of its analysis of the 50 site data. Staff's analysis will include data for the 50 GCI Project sites, as well as for six regional center

¹The Commission granted approval of the project to at least January 1, 1998.

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1 locations² associated with the Project. This report covers
2 conditions up to the end-of-year 1997.

3
4 Summary

5 The GCI Demonstration Project is still evolving as a
6 small number of GCI sites were not in service as of March, 1998,
7 and several local exchange sites have yet to convert to equal
8 access. As the Project is in transition, the Project's ultimate
9 profitability and impact on customers and the public interest can
10 only be estimated.

11 In general, quality of service and ability to transmit
12 data has improved for customers served by the GCI DAMA Project.
13 In every location some portion of the customer base employs GCI
14 services, whether it be credit card or other form of service.
15 Many customers have experienced lower bills as a result of a
16 competitive choice and improved subscription to Alascom optional
17 calling plans. GCI facilities in these locations also provide
18 customers with a backup communications path in the event of
19 failure of the Alascom system. Overall, customers in the GCI
20 Project area appear better off with the Project than without the
21 Project.

22 At the same time, issues exist over the financial
23 success of the Project. GCI invested significantly greater
24 amounts and will likely incur greater annual expenses than first
25

26

²Barrow, Bethel, Dillingham, King Salmon, Kotzebue, and Nome.

1 anticipated when the project was proposed to the Commission.
2 Furthermore, the Project overall does not currently appear
3 profitable, though that could change in future years as revenues
4 grow or if GCI can decrease costs. Many individual sites however
5 due to high cost and low demand for service, may never be
6 profitable on a stand alone basis.

7 For the 50 sites, not including the regional centers,
8 GCI's reported average retail revenue per site of about \$9,000 in
9 1997.³ In comparison, the average investment per site was around
10 \$329,000, and average expenses identified by GCI were about
11 \$55,000 per each of the 50 non-hub sites. Staff believes total
12 expenses could be \$26,800 per site higher than reported by GCI.
13 If debt coverage and a return on equity were considered, costs
14 would be significantly higher. The above conditions signal a
15 potential problem and indicate the need for continued reporting
16 by Alascom and GCI on the project.

17 GCI losses in the first years of operation would not be
18 surprising for a project of this scope. GCI may be willing to
19 accept some losses for its Project if it can achieve other
20 indirect benefits such as increased contracts with high volume
21 urban customers requiring some rural communications.

22 The profitability of GCI sites will affect whether GCI
23 will be able to serve on a facilities basis statewide, how fast
24

25
26 ³GCI reported switched retail revenues. No GCI private line
revenues were included. Alascom customer data would suggest few
private line customers in the 50 sites.

1 GCI will be able and willing to expand facilities to new areas,
2 whether GCI will have a financial incentive to relocate some of
3 its earth stations to more profitable sites, and whether the
4 current system is viable in the long term absent subsidy.

5 To date, the Project has had a variety of affects on
6 Alascom, many of them minor. Alascom recently upgraded some of
7 its rural facilities to DAMA technology. Whether the upgrade was
8 the result of competitive pressure, a response to customer
9 dissatisfaction, or a planned network upgrade remains unknown.
10 Alascom has not deployed DAMA technology as fast as originally
11 planned. Only 60 DAMA sites, out of the 92 sites planned in 1996
12 were deployed in 1997. Alascom reports improved service quality
13 associated with its DAMA sites. Alascom appears financially
14 strong even after construction of 60 sites under its DAMA project.

15 Generally the revenue and minutes impact of the
16 demonstration project on Alascom have been most evident in a few
17 key regional hub locations. For example, Alascom reported a
18 \$2,612,466 revenue loss for the six regional hubs and a revenue
19 gain of \$360,000 overall for the 50 non-hub sites. As the hubs
20 were open to facilities competition under 3 AAC 52.355, losses
21 might have occurred even if the Project did not exist. It is more
22 likely however that because of the Project there was increased
23 competition at the hub sites and more customers interested in
24 selecting GCI given its new network serving the surrounding
25 region.

26

1 Observed revenue reductions according to Alascom, are
2 not solely associated with lost customers to GCI and instead were
3 also attributable to Alascom customers choosing an Alascom calling
4 plan providing lower rates. This could indicate that while
5 Alascom rate schedules are offered statewide, in compliance with
6 3 AAC 52.370(a), advertising and marketing of the services are to
7 some degree geographically targeted to the competitive areas.

8 Alascom could experience additional revenue losses once
9 equal access is available in all of the 50 sites. A key issue
10 to evaluating the effect on the incumbent is both how much
11 revenues are lost to the competition, and how fast the change in
12 revenue occurs. For example, Alascom may be able to retain close
13 to its existing profitability if revenue losses due to the Project
14 are offset by annual traffic growth (5%), reduced costs, and
15 increased efficiency. Currently statewide traffic growth would
16 significantly offset Alascom's reported change in minutes
17 associated with the 56 sites. Of these 56 sites, the 50 non-hub
18 locations collectively showed a net gain in Alascom minutes in
19 1997. On a total company basis, Alascom remains profitable and
20 there is no evidence that the current level of competition with
21 GCI Project sites has led to rate increases or has unduly affected
22 Alascom retail revenues, profits, ability to obtain equity and
23 debt financing, and ability to invest in infrastructure. This
24 would suggest that in the short term, allowing more small sites
25 to be added to the Project may create greater benefit than
26 detriment to the customers.

1 The impact of opening the market as a whole depends upon
2 where and how quickly GCI will invest in rural earth stations.
3 In 1997, GCI operated at a loss and may not be financially in a
4 position to quickly build duplicate facilities statewide,
5 especially given the profitability of the Project to date.

6 As a last point, DAMA technology and earthstation
7 upgrade for both GCI and Alascom appear to be going slower than
8 originally expected, indicating that statewide deployment may take
9 years.⁴

10 The following sections of the Staff report will present
11 an individual review of the project status, investment, expenses,
12 changes in revenue, profitability, customer counts, minutes,
13 quality of service, local exchange effects, and other issues.

14
15 Project Status

16 GCI received approval for its Project on November 9,
17 1995, and planned to install equipment at the 50 sites during
18 1996.⁵ The first GCI Demonstration Project site was placed in
19 service in October, 1996, with a large number of subsequent sites
20 placed in service during 1997. See Attachment 1. As of March
21
22
23

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25 ⁴By these comments, Staff is not suggesting that DAMA is
necessarily the best technology for serving each site.

26 ⁵Testimony of Richard Dowling at 11, U-95-38, August 25,
1995.

1 1998, all GCI sites had been installed, though four sites were not
2 in service.⁶

3 GCI requested interconnection with the local exchange
4 carriers (LECs) at each of the 56 sites. LEC deployment of equal
5 access interconnection occurred at only ten sites in 1997. Twelve
6 sites were planned to have equal access by end of July 1998, and
7 all sites were expected to have equal access by February 1, 1999.
8 See Attachment 1. The full effect of the GCI Demonstration
9 Project cannot be observed until after all sites are on line and
10 equal access is available.

11 Alascom is in the early stages of deploying its DAMA
12 technology. Alascom began turning up its DAMA technology in
13 January 1997. Sixty locations were made operational by end-of-
14 year 1997. This is a 33% reduction from the 92 DAMA locations
15 originally planned. Alascom most recently stated it intends to
16 serve 82 villages with 75 DAMA stations. A comparison of
17 Alascom's original plan and current installation of DAMA technol-
18 ogy is provided as Attachment 2.

19
20 *Conclusion*

21 DAMA technology expansion and upgrade for both GCI and
22 Alascom are going slower than expected, indicating that statewide
23 provisioning of DAMA technology may take years. Though over two
24 years had passed since Commission approval was granted, GCI had
25

26

⁶Buckland, Nelson Lagoon, Shungnak, Wainwright.

1 been unable to put all of its 50 selected sites in service. LECs
2 will not implement equal access at all of the 56 sites until
3 1999.⁷ Some customers will be unable to take advantage of full 1+
4 dialing access to competitive long distance services until 1999.
5

6 Investment

7 Investment in the Project has exceeded GCI's stated
8 expectations and was steadily growing between 1996 and 1997. In
9 1995 GCI stated it was "risking up to \$17 million" in the
10 demonstration project.⁸ At that time total capital costs for the
11 project were estimated at \$12.3 M, and the locations to be
12 deployed had not been finalized.⁹

13 By December 31, 1997, GCI had invested \$27 M in the
14 project and average earth station investment for the original 50
15 sites was about \$329,000 per site (excluding common costs and
16 construction in progress). Attachment 3 provides the Project
17 investment over time for the 50 DAMA sites and the six regional
18 hubs.

19 GCI investment appears to have grown across virtually
20 all portions of the DAMA system. Current DAMA Project investment
21

22
23 ⁷Equal access interconnection has been a contentious issue
24 between GCI and some of the LECs. This Report does not express
25 a position on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
26 timing, methodology, or other issues related to equal access
conversion.

⁸Testimony of Ronald A. Duncan, at 10, U-95-38, 8/25/95.

⁹Duncan Testimony, Attachment RAD-4.

1 represents about 12% of GCI's total company plant and equipment
2 (\$224.4 M) as of December 31, 1997.¹⁰
3

4 Conclusion

5 GCI investment in the project has greatly exceeded
6 original expectations. Investment has grown significantly over
7 time and it is unknown when it will stabilize, though that may
8 occur soon as the majority of sites are now in service.
9

10 Expenses

11 GCI originally estimated total annual operating and
12 maintenance costs for the project at about \$3.2 M.¹¹ Staff
13 believes that 1997 expenses exceeded that estimate.

14 For the 56 sites GCI reported expenses of about
15 \$1,139,670 for 1996, and \$3,376,556 (about \$60,000 per site) for
16 1997.¹² GCI telephonically indicated that its reported expense
17 data was mostly for marketing, and operations, maintenance and
18 repair costs. The data does not appear to include other costs of
19 service such as transponder fees, off-network termination costs,
20

21
22 ¹⁰GCI interexchange carrier Annual Report pursuant to Section
23 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, for the
24 fiscal year ended December 31, 1997, at 23. Data represents
property and equipment plant in service, not net of depreciation
or amortization. Net property and equipment in service for 1997
was \$184 M.

25 ¹¹Duncan Testimony at Attachment RAD-4.

26 ¹²The GCI 1997 expense figure includes intrastate and
interstate access costs of \$644,931.

1 debt coverage, return, depreciation, and possibly other internal
2 GCI costs. Expense and investment ratios further support that
3 the reported \$3,376,556 expense figure is low. Using the \$3.4 M
4 figure, the Project's expenses to investment ratio is 12.5%, while
5 GCI's total company expense to investment ratio is about 93%.
6 Similarly, while the ratio of Project to total company plant was
7 about 12%; the ratio of Project to total company expenses was only
8 2%.

9 If expenses and investment in the Project are comparable
10 to GCI expenses and investment overall, then Staff would expect
11 Project expenses for 1997 to be higher than reported. Staff
12 estimates additional GCI expenses of \$1.5M as a very rough,
13 adjustment to account for depreciation and amortization, tran-
14 sponder costs, and fees paid to other carriers for termination of
15 traffic. All costs may not be included in Staff's analysis. The
16 \$1.5 M figure does not include an adjustment for debt coverage or
17 return on investment.

18 As an alternative for comparison to Staff's \$1.5 M
19 adjustment, Ben Johnson during his testimony before the Commission
20 estimated GCI's annual cost factor, that accounts for such items
21 as depreciation and the cost of money, at about 20% (which he
22 claimed was a comparable factor many companies used for various
23 types of telephone plant.)¹³ If the 20% factor were applied to
24 GCI's \$27 M investment, the annual cost associated with capital
25

26 ¹³Testimony of Ben Johnson, Ph.D. on behalf of the Staff, at
17, U-95-38, 10/17/95.

1 investment would be about \$5.4 M. Adding the \$5.4 M to GCI's
2 reported \$3.3 M expense and access costs would result in costs of
3 \$8.7 M, with some costs (e.g., transponder costs) not included in
4 the total.

5 Staff employs the \$1.5M expense adjustment in the
6 remainder of its analysis, with the understanding that this
7 adjustment may be low. Staff's adjusted expense figure for the
8 GCI Project for 1997 would be about \$4.9 M, with an annual average
9 expense per site per year of about \$87,000 for the 56 sites.

10 GCI expenses for 1996 and 1997 might not be typical for
11 future years as the project remains in a transitional phase. Not
12 all earth stations were in service in 1997 and access costs at
13 some locations may increase as the location is converted to equal
14 access and more minutes of traffic are carried. GCI may be able
15 to reduce its expenses given the experience it has gained managing
16 the Project. GCI expense data also does not reflect cost savings
17 GCI achieved by avoiding wholesale fees to other carriers since
18 GCI would carry much of its traffic over its own equipment.

19 Little comparable expense data is available regarding
20 Alascom's DAMA project expenses. Staff cannot verify Alascom's
21 claim that by initial estimate, costs of deploying Alascom's DAMA
22 system arrived within budget and that overall on-going costs for
23 provision have not changed dramatically. Alascom did not
24 quantify its statement except to report a \$6.5M "significant
25 change in costs" associated with the demonstration project sites.
26

1 *Conclusion*

2 Actual expenses for the GCI project in 1997 were over
3 the level originally planned for the project. Average costs per
4 site appear greater than existing average revenues for the 50 non-
5 hub sites.

6
7 Change in Revenues

8 Revenue data provides critical information regarding the
9 effects of competition on the incumbent and is a key component for
10 assessing the financial viability of the GCI project.

11 Total GCI project retail revenues reported in 1997 were
12 \$2.8 M, a substantial increase from 1996. Most revenues (84%)
13 were concentrated in the 6 regional hubs. The remaining 50 sites
14 were accountable for only \$448,729 total retail revenues.

15 In 1997, GCI held 17% and Alascom 83% of the market
16 revenues for the 56 sites. In equal access locations, GCI held
17 about 32% of the 1997 revenues. In non-equal-access locations,
18 Alascom retained a 92% share of the revenues. See Attachment 5.

19 The above trends indicate that GCI DAMA Project retail
20 revenues are growing and will likely continue to grow as equal
21 access availability increases. Revenues may also grow as the
22 result of traffic stimulation effects. Revenues for the GCI
23 Project (and for Alascom) may increase in future years depending
24 upon the provision of federally funded school, library, and rural
25 health care programs and other new service offerings.
26

1 The project revenues reported by GCI (as documented
2 above) did not include wholesale like revenues from other carriers
3 such as MCI and Sprint that "purchase" GCI services. In specific,
4 GCI has agreements to terminate all Alaska-bound MCI and Sprint
5 long distance traffic while MCI and Sprint will terminate portions
6 of GCI's interstate and international traffic on their systems.¹⁴
7 GCI reports that revenues attributable to the MCI and Sprint
8 agreements make up about 26% of total GCI revenues¹⁵ and about 35%
9 of GCI long distance revenues. The exact net MCI and Sprint
10 revenues associated with the 56 site Project were not reported.
11 As a vary crude, optimistic estimate, Staff attributes \$1 M or 35%
12 additional revenues above the Project retail revenues to account
13 for revenues generated by MCI/Sprint.

14 Alascom reported no significant change in 1996 demand,
15 revenues, or costs of service as a result of the GCI Project. As
16 more GCI sites came "on line" in 1997, Alascom reported both
17 significant reductions and increases in revenue by DAMA site.¹⁶
18 Alascom's change in revenue data reports only revenue associated
19 with originating minutes of calling.¹⁷ See Attachment 4 and 5.

21 ¹⁴GCI SEC Annual Report for year end 12/31/97 at 11, 12. MCI
22 agreed to terminate all of GCI's long distance traffic terminating
23 in the lower 49 states excluding Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii.
Sprint agreed to terminate all of GCI's international traffic.

24 ¹⁵GCI SEC Annual Report for end of year 12/31/97 at 11.

25 ¹⁶Alascom provides no documentation describing how it
calculated its reported changes in revenue.

26 ¹⁷It is unclear the extent to which terminating retail revenue
(continued...)

1 Major reported revenue losses experienced by Alascom for
2 the project area appear to be limited to a small handful of
3 locations. Out of the 56 sites, the six regional hubs account
4 for 52% of all Alascom site revenues and these sites experienced
5 \$2.6 M in revenue losses. Collectively the 50 remaining sites
6 represented a net positive "significant change" in revenue of
7 about \$361,000.

8 In its filing of March 31, 1998, Alascom indicated that
9 individual customer revenues decreased on average due in part to
10 customers selecting optional calling plans and moving from the
11 higher basic rate schedule. This would suggest that prior to
12 GCI's Demonstration Project, customers at the 56 sites were paying
13 more for telecommunications services on average than their urban
14 counterparts who regularly employ optional calling plans.

15 Alascom's statement that revenue losses were in part
16 caused by customers using calling plans is supported by GCI data.
17 Data indicates there is no direct and obvious correspondence
18 between GCI revenue gains in 1997 and Alascom revenue losses. The
19 table below provides an example of the variation between GCI and
20 Alascom revenues for sample locations:

21
22 ¹⁷(...continued)
23 should be considered in this analysis. In any event, the only
24 retail revenues likely excluded from Alascom's report would be for
25 calls originating outside, but terminating within, the 56 site
26 system. Such originating calls from rural locations may be low
as the GCI DAMA system was designed to cover a region's community
of interest. Alascom unreported revenues for originating calls
from urban locations to the 56 sites may for the most part be less
of an issue as facilities based competition has been available in
urban areas for a number of years.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Alascom Revenue 1997</u>	<u>Alascom Change in Revenue</u>	<u>GCI Revenue 1997</u>
1	\$1 M	(\$900,000)	\$150,000
2	\$70 k	(\$45,000)	\$ 2,000
3	\$200 k	(\$40,000)	\$ 80,000
4	\$100 k	\$20,000	\$ 4,000
5	\$100 k	\$15,000	\$ 10,000

Over the entire 56 site system, Alascom reported a relative change in annual revenue of (\$2.2 M) by end-of-year 1997.¹⁸ As previously stated, the \$2.2 M figure occurred in a year where not all sites were equal access sites. Ignoring traffic stimulation, Staff projects that Alascom might have had a revenue change of (\$3.7 M) by end-of-year 97 if all sites were equal access sites.¹⁹ In comparison, Alascom total company operating revenues for 1997 were \$235.5 M, with intrastate revenues at \$64.5 M. Alascom reported Total Operating Income and Intrastate Operating Income of \$28.4 M and \$1.5 M respectively, in 1997.²⁰

¹⁸Alascom does not indicate the jurisdictional nature of the data. Staff assumed the change in revenues data represented both interstate and intrastate losses.

¹⁹Based on equal access locations experiencing a reported change in revenue of about 23.6% in 1997 and \$9M in revenues for non-equal access sites. See Attachment 5, page 2.

²⁰Based on Alascom 1997 annual report data.

1 Conclusion

2 So far Alascom does not appear to be significantly
3 harmed by the Project. The majority of retail revenue losses
4 appear attributable to a small number of sites (mostly the larger
5 population locations) where facilities based competition is
6 already allowed. Reported Alascom retail revenue losses appeared
7 measurable, but minor (1%) compared to overall Alascom revenues.
8 One of the primary causes of Alascom's revenue reduction appeared
9 to be customers selecting better calling plans. Alascom did not
10 report material changes in wholesale revenues associated with the
11 Project.

12 In the 56 site system, though GCI revenues are quickly
13 growing, GCI holds relatively low overall market share (17% based
14 on retail revenue). GCI's has a higher market share (32%) in
15 equal access locations, indicating GCI revenue are likely to grow
16 as equal access becomes available system wide. If all sites were
17 converted to equal access, Staff estimates additional revenue
18 losses of \$1.5 M for Alascom, ignoring traffic stimulation
19 affects.

20 Profitability

21 Staff believes that the GCI Demonstration Project in
22 1997 was not profitable overall:

23	Expenses	(\$2,732,000)
24	Access	(\$ 644,931)
25	Staff Exp. Adj.	(\$1,500,000)
26	Revenue	\$2,770,297
	Staff Revenue Adj.	<u>\$1,000,000</u>
	Net:	(\$1,106,634)

Only one of the non-hub sites, Unalakleet, had equal access for over 11 months of 1997. Unalakleet is a relatively large site compared to most of the non-hub Project sites. For this site, 1997 revenues did not appear to exceed costs:

Expenses on average per site:	(\$ 48,800)
Access for Unalakleet:	(\$ 44,500)
Staff Exp. Adj.	(\$ 26,800)
Revenues for Unalakleet:	\$82,000
Staff Rev. Adj.	<u>\$28,700</u>
Net:	(\$ 9,400)

Below is a similar calculation for Ekok, a small site that had equal access beginning mid-May, 1997:

Expenses on average per site:	(\$ 48,800)
Access for Ekok:	(\$ 9,200)
Staff Exp. Adj.:	(\$ 26,800)
Revenues for Ekok:	\$ 9,000
Staff Rev. Adj.:	<u>\$ 3,100</u>
Net:	(\$ 72,700)

Staff's above estimates do not include debt service coverage (which could be significant in magnitude), a return on equity and possibly other costs.²¹ Net losses would be signifi-

²¹Staff recognizes that its \$1.5 M expense adjustment may not have considered all costs and revenues associated with the Project. To the extent GCI has better data, it may supplement the record on this point. Staff believes that to the extent its estimate is in error, it underestimates Project expenses relative to revenues.

1 cantly higher given costs calculated using Ben Johnson's
2 approach.²²

3 Staff anticipates project profitability will improve as
4 GCI attains equal access in its remote locations and as a result,
5 increased revenues. Staff estimates that once equal access is
6 available at all sites, GCI could achieve about \$2.4 M in
7 additional retail revenues to offset a portion of the overall
8 project losses.²³ Some of this revenue increase will be offset by
9 access costs associated with the increased traffic. Traffic
10 stimulation and increased revenues from other services (e.g.,
11 private line, schools) would also likely increase profitability.

12 In addition, while the entire project or any individual
13 site might not be profitable on a *stand alone basis*, it still may
14 be advantageous to GCI if it can reduce GCI's total costs of
15 serving high cost areas or can increase GCI revenues in areas
16 outside of the Project. For example, GCI likely achieved some
17 cost savings from the Project as it would no longer need to
18 purchase wholesale transmission and switching services from
19 Alascom for services to the 50 sites.²⁴ Revenues at locations
20

21
22 ²²See discussion of page 10-11.

23 ²³Assuming revenues for the non-equal-access sites will track
24 that for the equal-access sites where GCI was able to achieve
about a third of market revenues.

25 ²⁴Staff does not have average cost information, but the
26 Alascom wholesale rates for a Category III to Category III call
during peak hours is about \$.30/minute. In comparison, GCI total
unadjusted expenses per minute were about \$.39/minute for the
Project. Expenses, after Staff's adjustment, were about

1 outside of the Project may improve if GCI is better able to win
2 critical urban/hub customers needing access to rural areas. As
3 previously noted by Ben Johnson in his testimony on this matter,²⁵
4 introduction of higher quality service may also i) improve the
5 degree of traffic stimulation, improving revenues, ii) enhance
6 quality of service and GCI's physical presence in the rural areas,
7 allowing GCI to increase its share of the market statewide, and
8 iii) enhance GCI's image as a state-of-the-art, full service,
9 statewide carrier.

10 Most importantly, the profitability of the GCI project
11 in 1997 reflects a project under development. Staff believes that
12 some start up losses for a project of this size and scope would
13 not be unusual. At the same time, the degree of profitability for
14 this project suggests continued reporting by Alascom and GCI for
15 the project area.

16 GCI on a total company basis had a net loss of \$2.2M in
17 1997.²⁶ The company attributed its loss to additional deprecia-
18 tion, amortization and interest expenses resulting from the cable
19 company acquisition in October 1996 and startup losses from GCI's
20 entry into the local market. In comparison, for the years 1996
21 through 1994, GCI typical net earnings were slightly above \$7 M
22 each year. In 1997, GCI had a debt to equity ratio of about

24 ²⁴(...continued)
25 \$.60/minute.

26 ²⁵Ben Johnson testimony at 17, 10/95.

²⁶GCI SEC Annual Report at 26.

1 55%/45%; long term debt of about \$250 M; and total assets of
2 \$545M.²⁷

3 In comparison, as of December 31, 1997, Alascom for its
4 interexchange operations (both interstate and intrastate) had no
5 long term debt; approximately \$370 M in stockholder equity; \$89.5
6 M in retained earnings; \$25.5 M net income and total assets of
7 \$426.7 M.²⁸ These figures reflect Alascom's status after installa-
8 tion of 60 DAMA sites.

9
10 *Conclusion*

11 Staff concludes that in 1997, Alascom was more profit-
12 able than GCI, and was better able to fund any needed investments
13 due to its low debt and high retained earnings. At the same time,
14 Alascom investment in rural areas (evaluated solely on number of
15 DAMA sites installed), was only slightly greater than that for
16 GCI, and below planned levels. This suggests factors outside of
17 Alascom's ability to finance infrastructure are limiting the rate
18 of facilities upgrade in rural areas. Neither the GCI DAMA
19 project nor Alascom's own DAMA project would appear to have unduly
20 compromised Alascom's ability to fund future investment or
21 maintain a profit.

22 The GCI project overall would appear unprofitable in
23 1997. To the extent GCI has earned profits on its project, those
24

25
26 ²⁷GCI SEC Annual Report at 26.

²⁸Alascom 1997 Annual Report at Schedule B-1.

1 profits are mostly associated with its six regional hubs. Some of
2 the smaller GCI DAMA sites may never be profitable on a stand
3 alone basis. Profitability is expected to improve in the future.
4 At this stage Staff is hesitant to suggest when the Project will
5 become profitable. GCI data raises uncertainty as to whether GCI
6 has the financial resources in the short term to expand its DAMA
7 investment to cover all of Alaska, or the inclination to expand
8 statewide if individual sites continue a pattern of
9 unprofitability.

11 Change in Customers

12 For 1997 in the 56 sites reviewed, Staff estimates that
13 Alascom lost on average, about 28% of its presubscribed customer
14 base to GCI as a result of competition in the interexchange
15 market.²⁹ The 28% figure includes data for locations where there
16 are no presubscribed GCI customers as there is no equal access.
17 In the areas with equal access during 1997, GCI's presubscribed
18 customer share was much higher and averaged 46% for the project.
19 See Attachment 4. Staff estimates that GCI's customer share may
20 approach the 46% level project wide once all locations are
21 converted to equal access.

25 ²⁹This estimate was calculated by comparing total GCI PICC
26 access lines to total Alascom MTS customers as of end-of-year
1997. Staff has no data to identify new customers to the system
separately from existing Alascom customers converting to GCI.

1 Four regional hubs³⁰ of the 56 sites reviewed appeared
2 to account for the majority of presubscribed customers lost by
3 Alascom to GCI. In specific, these four locations account for 89%
4 of all presubscribed customers switched to GCI, with the remaining
5 52 locations accounting for only 11% of the switched customers.

6 While customer information reflects the extent to which
7 the public has exercised a choice in carrier, it does not always
8 provide a good indicator of the impact of competition on the
9 incumbent carrier. Average customer count data does not reflect
10 the extent to which a carrier has been able to attract the most
11 profitable, high volume customers. Secondly, the GCI customer
12 data looks unusual³¹ and does not represent a full "apples to
13 apples" comparison to the Alascom data. This suggests the
14 Commission should place limited reliance on the customer data.

15
16 *Conclusion*

17 GCI continues to gain customers, with most gains in
18 areas with equal access.
19
20
21
22

23 ³⁰Barrow, Bethel, Nome, and King Salmon.

24 ³¹ For example, Staff cannot explain why GCI reports that in
25 Barrow it has over 1000 presubscribed customers, but only 87
26 customers have used some form of GCI services. GCI and Alascom
data may be slightly different as GCI reported customer access
lines assigned to GCI while Staff believes Alascom reported
customer counts.

1 Change in Minutes

2 Among the 56 sites, Alascom retains about 93% of the
3 total market minutes, with GCI at 7% of the market minutes (1997
4 data). Even in the larger population centers where competition
5 with GCI is likely to be strongest, Alascom has retained a high
6 percentage (between 92% and 98%) of market minutes. Alascom in
7 its March 31, 1998 report indicated it had not observed an
8 increase in individual customers' minutes of use in the DAMA
9 locations.

10 Six regional hub sites collectively account for 52% of
11 all Alascom minutes for the 56 site system. For Alascom, the
12 average minutes per site for these six sites is ten times the
13 average minutes per site for all other sites. For GCI, these
14 same six sites represent about 35% of all GCI reported minutes for
15 the project sites.

16 Traffic growth statewide may compensate Alascom in part
17 for minutes and revenue losses associated with the Project:

		Minutes	
19 Access Minutes:	1994	614.6 M	
	1995	656.4 M	7% growth
	1996	686.8 M	5% growth
	1997	718.2 M	5% growth

22
23 1998 Expected Growth statewide (GCI & Alascom): 18 M call minutes
24 Alascom change in minutes in 1997 ALL 56 SITES:(18.6M) call
minutes

25 Alascom change in minutes in 1997 for 50 NON-HUB SITES:
26 1.1 M call minutes

1 Based on the above, traffic stimulation affects may
2 significantly offset a portion of minute losses experienced by
3 Alascom for the 56 sites and would likely cover future losses for
4 the 50 non-hub sites.

5 The GCI minutes data for its six hubs looks unusual low.
6 Specifically, while GCI has a 25% revenue share for its hubs, it
7 only has a 4.6% share of the minutes. In addition, Staff cannot
8 explain why Unalakleet would have a higher minutes count than any
9 other GCI location (including Nome, Barrow and Bethel). Staff
10 therefore recommends that the Commission place less reliance on
11 the GCI minutes data than other reported data unless the unusually
12 low minutes count is explained.

13
14 *Conclusion*

15 Alascom continues to have a high share of the market
16 minutes for the Project sites. Most minute losses for Alascom are
17 concentrated in the six regional hubs. Overall the 50 non-hub
18 Alascom locations did not experience a loss in traffic.

19
20 Quality of Service

21 GCI stated in testimony in Docket U-95-38 that the new
22 equipment it would install under the demonstration project would
23 significantly upgrade and enhance the interexchange telecommunica-
24 tions services available in its 50 rural locations. GCI offered
25 telemedicine and distance education as examples of the services
26 that might be provided under its project. Alascom in its March

1 31, 1998, report in Docket U-95-38 stated that customer feedback
2 suggests that call quality between DAMA locations has improved.

3 Staff agrees DAMA technology has improved quality of
4 service and data transmission speeds for customers compared to
5 older analog satellite equipment. DAMA technology provides more
6 throughput in a satellite transponder, leading to a more efficient
7 transponder cost. In addition, the DAMA technology will eliminate
8 double satellite hops for customers who originate calls that are
9 terminated on the same DAMA system, reducing transmission delay
10 and improving quality of the talk path.

11 Staff notes that the expected customer data rates for
12 both the GCI and DAMA sites is about 14.4 Kbps. While this is
13 likely an improvement over data rates under the Alascom analog
14 system, the State Telecommunications Modernization Plan (3 AAC
15 53.705(g)) requires that both IXCs by February 13, 2003, provide
16 switched digital service at 56 Kbps to any customer upon request.
17 Limitation in the data rate may be a function of satellite
18 communications as currently configured rather than a feature
19 related solely to DAMA technology.

20 Impact on Interconnecting LECS

21 LECs faced increased costs to interconnect with GCI and
22 provide full equal access services. Costs of equal access
23 conversion were estimated by the local carrier as between \$30,000
24 and \$64,000 per site for locations served by the Arctic Slope
25
26

1 Telephone Association Cooperative³² and between \$0.00 and \$39,800
2 per site for TelAlaska.³³

3 The Commission has ordered GCI financially responsible
4 for all reasonable and necessary costs incurred by local exchange
5 companies to interconnect with GCI's equipment, for costs not
6 recoverable through access charge revenues.³⁴

7 Conclusion

8 Staff concludes that to the extent there are increased
9 GCI Project related LEC costs of interconnection and equal access,
10 there is no evidence such costs will not be recovered by the LEC.
11 The direct impact of the Project on LECs should be minimal if the
12 reasonable interconnection and equal access costs can be recovered
13 through access rates and other charges. Increased access rates
14 however, could increase interexchange system costs.

15
16 Other Reported Factors Affecting the Market

17 In its December 1996 report, GCI claimed that Alascom's
18 CustomNet offering had induced significant customers to accept
19 term commitments before a competitive choice was available.
20

21
22 ³²There was a dispute between GCI and various LECs concerning
23 the provisioning of equal access and associated cost recovery.
24 The costs identified by Staff are for one of three upgrade options
identified by ASTAC in a letter dated December 6, 1996, between
ASTAC and Marie Matthews of GCI.


25 ³³Exhibit 4, Page 1 of 1, Interior and Mukluk's Answer to
GCI's Complaint, U-97-109, July 7, 1997.

26 ³⁴Order U-95-38(9), at Ordering Paragraph 1(f). See also
Orders U-95-38(12), U-97-109(1).

1 Comparison of 56 Sites to the Statewide Network

2 There are about 254 exchanges in Alaska, a small number
3 of which are located in urban areas.³⁵ The 56 sites under review
4 therefore represent about 20% of the total Alascom rural statewide
5 network. As a very rough estimate, the effects of the GCI
6 Demonstration Project may be about one fifth of what could occur
7 if the project were broadened statewide. For example, if the same
8 extent of investment is needed statewide as occurred on the
9 Project, GCI might need to invest about \$75 M more in earth
10 station equipment to provide DAMA coverage to the entire state.³⁶
11 As previously stated, it is unclear whether GCI is financially
12 able to make such an additional investment at this time.

13
14 Respectfully submitted this 8th day of September, 1998.
15
16

17 
18 Lorraine Kenyon
19 Common Carrier Specialist
20
21
22
23

24 ³⁵Alaska Telephone Association, 1997-1998 statistical
25 information at 1.

26 ³⁶DAMA may not be the best technology for all sites.
Estimates were based on existing direct investment of \$19 M for
50 sites.

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THE ALASKA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Before Commissioners:

Sam Cotten, Chairman
Alyce A. Hanley
Dwight D. Ornquist
Tim Cook
James M. Posey

In the Matter of the Request by
GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC., for
Waiver of 3 AAC 52.355(a) and
Approval of a 50-Site Demonstra-
tion Project

)
) U-95-38
)
)
)

CERTIFICATION OF MAILING

I, Lee D. Ault, certify as follows:

I am an Administrative Clerk II in the offices of the
Alaska Public Utilities Commission, 1016 West Sixth Avenue,
Suite 400, Anchorage, Alaska 99501.

On October 14th, 1998, I mailed copies of

REVISED REDACTED STAFF REPORT

in the proceeding identified above to the persons indicated on
the attached service list.

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 14th day of October, 1998.

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